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INTRODUCTION 
American society is simultaneously growing more religiously diverse1 
and more politically divided along religious lines.2 These phenomena 
 1. DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTY” HAS NOW 
BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 1 (2001) (describing America as 
“radically” more religiously diverse than thirty years ago); see also DAVID BROOKS, ON PARADISE 
DRIVE 10 (2004) (describing the growth in denominational diversity and its effect on American 
culture); Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and its 
Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 127 (2003) (“The last thirty-five years have seen an 
exponential increase in American pluralism, and in the number and diversity of religions.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Susan Page, Churchgoing Closely Tied to Voting Patterns, U.S.A. TODAY, June 6, 
2004, at A1; Peter Steinfels, Using How People Worship to Assess Who Votes for Whom, Finding 
More Than One “Religion Gap”, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at B6; see also Robin Toner, The Culture 
Wars, Part II, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 1. 
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thrust many of religion’s most controversial intersections with law into the 
nation’s courts.3 Federal courts wrestle with these issues amidst significant 
compositional changes requiring heated political battles over selecting 
those courts’ future members.4 Recent controversies indicate that judicial 
candidates’ religious involvements, views, and motivations will play an 
increasingly important role in these debates.5
This resurfacing of religion in judicial selection brought to light a 
largely forgotten6 provision of the Constitution providing that “[n]o 
 3. Federal courts recently resolved several contentious disputes involving expressly religious 
topics such as public funding of religious education and invocations of God in public schools. See, 
e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (public funding for theology education); Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (public funding of religious schools); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (school prayer); Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 
2002) (recitation of “under God” as part of Pledge of Allegiance in public schools), amended by 328 
F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) 
(dismissed for lack of standing). In addition, both federal and state courts have recently faced 
religiously divisive disputes concerning issues about which religious beliefs motivated advocates on 
both sides. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in consensual 
homosexual sodomy); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (abortion); Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (same-sex marriage).  
 4. President George W. Bush will likely appoint at least one Supreme Court justice during his 
second term. See Jeffrey Rosen, Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2004, § 4, at 1 (exploring what kind of justice Bush may appoint). In addition, lower federal court 
appointments are increasingly subject to extensive public scrutiny. See Will Baude, Pro Circuit, NEW 
REPUBLIC ONLINE, July 21, 2004, at http://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=express&s=baude072104 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005). 
 5. See infra notes 30–32, 36–43, 52–55, 129–30 and accompanying text. I often refer to 
prospective federal judges both before and after presidential nomination as “judicial candidates” or 
“candidates” to avoid as much of the confusing nomenclature of the judicial selection process as 
possible. 
 6. Constitutional protection of and from religion is typically discussed in the context of the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses. Although scholars devote considerable attention to the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses, they hardly notice the Religious Test Clause. E.g., MICHAEL W. 
MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002) (discussing the Religious Test Clause 
for 8 of 937 pages). Popular discourse follows this scholarly tradition by sometimes ignoring the 
Religious Test Clause’s very existence. See, e.g., Walter Isaacson, God of Our Fathers, TIME, July 5, 
2004, at 62 (“The one clear proclamation on the issue of religion in the founding documents is, of 
course, the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added). The Clause’s few conservationists recognize its 
unique and oft-overlooked place in American constitutional thought. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No 
Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 
37 CASE W. L. REV. 674, 677 (1987) (“All but completely ignored . . . is the only occasion on which 
the Constitution’s makers actually addressed [religion].”) (emphasis in original); Sanford Levinson, 
The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1047, 1050 (1990) [hereinafter Levinson, Confrontation] (“We should . . . pay special attention 
to article VI of the Constitution. . . .”). 
 In some contexts, the Religious Test Clause and the Establishment Clause are closely interwoven. 
See Theriault v. A Religious Office in the Structure of the Gov’t Requiring a Religious Test as a 
Qualification, 895 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1990) (considering whether “the protections of the religious 
test clause are coextensive with those of the establishment and free exercise clauses”); Anderson v. 
Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (D.D.C. 1970) (“[T]he banning of the religious test oath in the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/7
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religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification” for holding public 
office.7 Members of both political parties recently accused their political 
opponents of violating the Religious Test Clause by considering religion 
in their judicial selection decisions.8 The ensuing debate centered on 
whether religion had impermissibly entered into the respective political 
branches’9 traditionally broad discretion in testing the substantive 
ideologies of judicial candidates by surpassing the textual limitation on 
that discretion represented in the Religious Test Clause.10 Although 
participants in these debates repeatedly invoked the Clause, their 
arguments failed to sufficiently clarify how the Clause should apply to 
judicial selection.  
This Note attempts to fill that void. Part I begins by proposing a model 
to provide a more nuanced understanding of “religion” and “ideology.”11 
The model places religious affiliation on one end of a continuum and 
secularly motivated ideology on the other, and attempts to trace the 
contours of the line between the two. After describing the model, I turn to 
religion’s role in judicial selection.12 Historically, religious affiliation and 
religiously motivated ideology have played significant roles in judicial 
selection, although the political branches have rarely considered theology 
in determining whom to nominate or confirm. 
Constitution was to keep the Federal Government from creating an established religion. . . . Thus, from 
an historical standpoint there is a close connection between the establishment prohibition and the test 
oath prohibition.”), rev’d, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Professor Stephen Carter alluded to a 
possible Establishment Clause violation from express discussion of religious belief in Senate 
nomination hearings. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 
936–37 (1989). However, there is no indication that the Religious Test Clause does not apply to the 
specific issue of religious tests for federal judicial office. See J. Gregory Sidak, True God of the Next 
Justice, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11–12 (2001). Regardless, Establishment Clause implications are 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States.”).  
 8. In 2002, President George W. Bush announced that he would only nominate judges who 
believe that “our rights were derived from God.” David Von Drehle, Judge Blocks Pledge Decision 
During Appeals; Republicans Seek Political Gain, But Ruling Spurs Bipartisan Ire, WASH. POST, June 
28, 2002, at A6; see also infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. The next year, senators of both 
parties accused other senators of unconstitutionally considering judicial candidates’ religious 
affiliations and ideologies. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 9. I describe the president and senate as the “political branches” while recognizing the 
sometimes political and ideological nature of judicial decisions. See infra note 64. 
 10. See Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 
355, 365–66 (1994–95) (describing the Religious Test Clause as a general limitation on political 
branch discretion). 
 11. See infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
 12. See infra notes 20–55 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part II describes the potentially conflicting constitutional provisions at 
issue.13 On one hand, the Constitution provides the political branches 
significant discretion to test judicial candidates’ ideologies.14 On the other, 
the Religious Test Clause prohibits religious tests for judicial office.15 By 
exploring the theoretical underpinnings of ideological tests and the 
Religious Test Clause’s historical roots, I explain that the constitutional 
values may not be contradictory but that we must delineate some line 
between “religious” tests and “political” or “ideological” tests. 
Part III discusses how other scholars and a few political leaders have 
applied the Religious Test Clause to judicial selection.16 Most assume that 
the Religious Test Clause prohibits tests for religious affiliation or 
theology. However, there is no consensus about whether testing a 
candidate’s religiously motivated ideology violates the Clause.  
Finally, Part IV analyzes which qualities of judicial candidates the 
Religious Test Clause should deem sufficiently “religious” to be beyond 
political branch scrutiny.17 By distinguishing between the Religious Test 
Clause’s appropriate prohibitions and the traditional sphere of ideological 
inquiry, I suggest that the Religious Test Clause should prohibit 
denominational and theological tests for judicial office, while it should 
permit ideological inquiry regardless of possible religious motivation. 
I. RELIGION’S ROLE IN JUDICIAL SELECTION 
A. A Model of “Religion” and “Ideology” 
Separating the religious qualities political branches could consider into 
four general categories helps clarify our understanding of ideology and 
religion in the judicial selection process, as well as how best to apply the 
Religious Test Clause to judicial selection. I describe those general 
categories as religious affiliation, theological beliefs, religiously motivated 
ideology, and secularly motivated ideology.  
On one end of the continuum is religious affiliation. The umbrella term 
“religious affiliation” includes a candidate’s affiliation with a religious 
group or denomination. The religious denomination with which a 
candidate identifies can inform the candidate’s theological beliefs. In this 
 13. See infra notes 56–125 and accompanying text. 
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 16. See infra notes 127–48 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 150–79. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/7
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sense, “theological beliefs” describe a candidate’s personal beliefs about 
God and human relationships with God.18  
In some cases, a candidate’s theological beliefs motivate that 
candidate’s ideological views. “Religiously motivated ideological beliefs” 
are views that do not depend on that candidate’s status as a religious 
believer per se: Individuals could share the same ideological convictions 
regardless of whether they deduce their ideological views from religious or 
secular premises. I consider these religiously motivated ideological beliefs 
separate from religious affiliation and theology because religiously 
motivated ideological beliefs do not depend solely on a candidate’s status 
as a religious believer; rather, the term “religiously motivated ideology” 
describes the direct influence of a candidate’s personal subscription to a 
particular application of denominational doctrine or theology on that 
candidate’s future judicial decisionmaking.19  
On the opposite end of the continuum from religious affiliation are 
ideological beliefs with purely secular bases. Because I presume that the 
traditional ideological scrutiny of judicial candidates will continue in the 
future, discussion of “secularly motivated ideology” will form very little 
of the analysis below. Instead, I focus on religious affiliation, theology, 
and religiously motivated ideology.  
Admittedly, the boundaries between the four categories sometimes 
overlap. For example, a judicial candidate’s view on an issue may not be 
clearly theological or clearly ideological. For some beliefs, the theological 
and ideological applications may be very difficult to decipher. In this 
Note, I place a variety of controversies in the category I find most 
appropriate. But rather than provide answers to all possible eventualities, I 
suggest these categories as rough generalized areas into which future 
debates should attempt to categorize particular issues as they arise. 
 18. Cf. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1794 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “theology” as “[t]he 
study of the nature of God and religious truth”); WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
1223 (1990) (defining “theology” as “the study of religious faith, practice, and experience” and “God 
and his relation to the world”). But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734–35 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that, in the education context, “theology” includes purely secular perspectives 
rather than only religious perspectives). Thus, I use the term “theology” to describe a certain subset of 
religious beliefs; I refer to religious beliefs that directly affect a judge’s future decisionmaking as 
religiously motivated ideology. 
 19. Cf. Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 351, 355–56 (1998) 
(finding that in recusals it is “not the judge’s status as a Catholic per se which is claimed to be 
disqualifying, but the fact that Catholic religious doctrine is . . . opposed to capital punishment and that 
[the judge] personally subscribes to that doctrine”). This description of religiously motivated ideology 
includes all views of a candidate—including even those views commonly considered “religious”—that 
directly affect the candidate’s future judicial decisionmaking.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. The Role of Religious Affiliation 
The political branches historically consider judicial candidates’ 
religious affiliations without regard for the Religious Test Clause.20 In the 
mid-twentieth century, religious affiliation of Supreme Court justices and 
potential justices became so important that some commentators referred to 
seats by the occupants’ religious affiliations.21 Commentators frequently 
referred to the “Jewish Seat” and the “Catholic Seat” after the long line of 
justices identifying with the Jewish and Catholic faiths.22  
While some have opposed various candidates because of their religious 
affiliation, a candidate’s religious affiliation more often works in the 
candidate’s favor, frequently for non-religious political reasons. In 
surprisingly few instances, candidates’ religious affiliations worked 
against their nomination. Justices Roger Taney and Clarence Thomas 
faced opposition from senators suspicious of whether they would be 
beholden to papal dictates because they were Catholic.23 Likewise, 
President Hoover feared nominating Benjamin Cardozo to the Supreme 
Court because Cardozo would be the second Jewish member of the 
Court.24 President Richard Nixon appointed William Rehnquist to the 
Court despite Rehnquist being a “damned Protestant” and Nixon’s 
temptation to “[t]ell him to change his religion and try to get him 
baptized” prior to nomination.25
 20. THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT 11 (1978). For example, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee apparently seeks information about a judicial candidate’s religious 
affiliation as part of its inquiry into the candidate’s background. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of 
Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 577–78 (2004). 
 Although historical traditions may sometimes deem otherwise unconstitutional practices 
constitutional, I presume that the Religious Test Clause still applies in full force to federal judicial 
selection. 
 21. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 11.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Barbara A. Perry, The Life and Death of the “Catholic Seat” on the United States Supreme 
Court, 6 J.L. & POL. 55, 58–60 (1989) (discussing senatorial opposition to Taney’s Catholicism); 
Sidak, supra note 6, at 10–11 (discussing Senator Orrin Hatch’s skepticism of Thomas’s Catholicism).  
 24. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 83–84. 
 25. JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 231 (2002); see also NBC News: Today, 
2004 WL 56560132 (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 10, 2004) (interviewing Chief Justice 
Rehnquist). Upon first hearing Rehnquist’s name, Nixon apparently asked his staff whether Rehnquist 
was Jewish. Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2005, at 79, 87. If Nixon’s 
concern over Rehnquist’s religious affiliation was legally substantive, he may have been pleased to see 
that Rehnquist’s jurisprudence has been less than faithful to Lutheran doctrine. See Marie A. Failinger, 
The Justice Who Wouldn’t Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing the Wisdom of Faith Traditions, 46 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 643 (1998).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/7
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Religious affiliation has more often aided judicial candidates. In the 
nominations of at least five Catholic justices, their Catholicism was a 
decisive factor in the president choosing to nominate them.26 Presidents 
and senators generally based explicit consideration of religious affiliation 
on two rationales. First, some thought that the federal judiciary should be 
representative of religious and cultural minorities, a view similar to 
arguments in favor of affirmative action programs.27 Second, some used 
religious affiliation as a mechanism through which they could solidify 
support for their political agendas among the candidate’s religious group.28 
Presidents and senators alike have manipulated the selection of Catholic or 
Jewish judicial candidates to appeal to like-affiliated voters.29 In 2003 and 
2004, some expanded this political manipulation by using candidates’ 
religious affiliations as campaign propaganda against political 
opponents.30 Even more recently, the role of conservative evangelicals in 
 26. See Perry, supra note 23, at 71–91 (finding Catholicism a decisive factor in the appointments 
of Justices Pierce Butler, Frank Murphy, Joseph McKenna, and Edward White); see also Bernard 
Weinraub, O’Connor Was Also Reported Contender, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1986, at D26 (describing 
Scalia’s qualifications as including his Catholic lineage); William Safire, El Nino’s Current, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 1986, at A31 (quoting a conservative political source describing Scalia’s Catholicism 
as one of his major qualifications for the Supreme Court).  
 27. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 79. “Symbolic importance” of the “growing 
acceptability” of religious minorities allegedly warrants denominational balance as an important goal 
in selecting justices. See id. at 144; see also Sanford Levinson, Who is a Jew(ish Justice)?, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2359, 2362 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson, Jewish Justice] (finding that Justices 
Brandeis and Frankfurter may have been appointed more for their Jewish cultural identification than 
their Jewish religious identification). For the analogies between affirmative action and religion law, 
see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 940–41 
(2004). 
 28. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 144. 
 29. Examples of political manipulation abound. Several senators attempted to appease their 
growing Catholic constituencies by supporting President Cleveland’s nomination of Edward White. 
See Perry, supra note 23, at 64. President Franklin Roosevelt “nurtured Catholic support . . . by 
appointing Roman Catholics to office in unprecedented numbers.” Id. at 74. Likewise, President 
Eisenhower considered Justice William Brennan’s Catholicism a boost to his efforts to win votes in 
New England. Rodney A. Grunes & Jon Veen, Justice Brennan, Catholicism, and the Establishment 
Clause, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 527, 538 (2001); see also KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 80 
(noting that President Eisenhower, “seeking votes in the industrial northeast, named William Brennan 
to the Court” thereby reinstalling a Catholic Seat on the Court). President Nixon was “consumed by 
questions about how the . . . religion . . . of nominees would play.” David Greenberg, Admit the 
Obvious—It’s a Political Process: Ideology Governs Judicial Confirmations. Let’s Say So, WASH. 
POST, July 18, 2004, at B3.  
 Appeal for the Jewish vote was an “important factor” in the appointment of the line of Jewish 
justices commonly described as the Jewish Seat. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 144. One 
senator allegedly opposed Justice Brandeis’ nomination out of resentment for President Wilson using 
Brandeis’ Judaism as a “play for the Jewish vote.” Id. at 50. 
 30. In 2003 confirmation hearings, Senator Orrin Hatch asked circuit judge nominee William 
Pryor to state his Catholic affiliation. Nomination of William H. Pryor, Jr., to be United States Circuit 
Judge for the Eleventh Circuit before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 56 (2003) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the 2004 reelection of President George W. Bush has led some to wonder 
whether the President and his political advisors will seek to repay or build 
more support within that constituency by appointing a justice who is a 
conservative evangelical.31
Although rare, the political branches have sometimes expressly 
rejected consideration of judicial candidates’ religious affiliations. At least 
two presidents refused to consider a candidate’s religious affiliation after 
their aides encouraged them to do so.32 Likewise, Congress twice 
instructed the president to not take religious affiliation into account when 
nominating judges.33 An amendment to Senate rules proposed in 2004 
would deem “any question of the [judicial] nominee relating to the 
religious affiliation of the nominee” out of order.34 Aside from these 
(testimony of William Pryor). Conservative groups then used Senator Hatch’s questioning in television 
and newspaper advertisements against the Democratic members of the Judiciary Committee. Capitol 
Report, 2003 WL 70481812 (CNBC television broadcast, July 30, 2003) (interviewing Senator 
Richard Durbin and C. Boyden Gray about the advertisements). The advertisements ran in states with 
large Catholic populations whose Democratic senators opposed Pryor’s nomination. Id. For criticism 
from both sides of the political landscape, compare Richard Cohen, Bad Faith Advertising, WASH. 
POST, July 29, 2003, at A17 (referring to the advertisements as “a demagogic lie”); and 149 CONG. 
REC. S14,641 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (rebuking Republican senators and 
the groups running the advertisements for “misus[ing] religion . . . by playing wedge politics”); with 
Byron York, Catholics Need Not Apply?, NAT’L REV., July 30, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview. 
com/york/york073003.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The debate over the allegedly improper use of 
religion in the Pryor and Pickering nominations denigrated to the levels of profanity. See Agence 
France Presse, Cheney Has No Regrets Over Use of F-word to Curse Senator, June 25, 2004, available 
at 2004 WL 84617317 (describing Vice President Dick Cheney’s use of profanity against a senator 
when discussing the Pryor and Pickering nominations).
 31. Susan Jacoby, The God Squad, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2005, at 11 (“Leaders of the Religious 
Right are demanding a hard-line conservative Supreme Court as a payback for their contribution to the 
re-election of President George W. Bush.”); see also Dan Giligoff & Bret Schulte, The Dobson Way, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 17, 2005, available at 2005 WL 61434219. 
 32. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 23, at 70 (describing President Taft’s refusal to consider Justice 
White’s Catholicism in promoting him to Chief Justice). When President Truman nominated Tom 
Clark, a Protestant, to the supposed “Catholic Seat,” Truman responded to Catholic criticism by 
stating: “I do not believe religions have anything to do with Supreme Court. If an individual has the 
qualifications, I do not care if he is a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew.” Id. at 80. In addition to Taft and 
Truman, President Bill Clinton apparently did not consider Justices Stephen Breyer’s and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s Jewish faith in deciding whether to nominate them to the Supreme Court. See Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, From Benjamin to Brandeis to Breyer: Is There a Jewish Seat?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 229, 235 
(2002). 
 33. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333, 351 (“It is the sense of the Congress that the President, in selecting individuals for 
nomination to the Federal judgeships created by this Act, shall give due consideration to qualified 
individuals without regard to . . . religion. . . .”); Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 
1629, 1633 (“The Congress . . . suggests that the President, in selecting individuals for nomination to 
the Federal judgeships created by this Act, give due consideration to qualified individuals regardless of 
. . . religion. . . .”). 
 34. S. Res. 207, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Patrick Leahy & Richard Durbin, Injecting 
Religion into the Judicial Nominations Process, at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200307/073103f.html 
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formal pronouncements, individual senators have sometimes informally 
discouraged presidents from considering a candidate’s affiliation.35
C. The Role of Theological Beliefs 
The political branches have not traditionally considered candidates’ 
theological beliefs relevant to judicial selection decisions. Theological 
tests were not commonplace until recently when federal and state judicial 
selection processes began requiring judicial candidates to profess 
theological beliefs.36  
Prior to 2002, the only known theological test applied to a federal 
judicial candidate was when one senator refused to support Judge Robert 
Bork’s Supreme Court nomination because Bork “refus[ed] to discuss his 
belief in God or the lack thereof.”37 In 2002, President George W. Bush 
announced an apparent theological litmus test for potential federal 
judges.38 To be nominated by President Bush, a candidate must believe 
that “rights were derived from God.”39 While it is unclear whether—and 
perhaps unlikely that—the Administration formally requires profession of 
that belief, one of President Bush’s nominees publicly articulated his 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005) (explaining proposal).  
 35. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 85 (describing Senator William Borah’s 
conversations discouraging President Hoover from considering Cardozo’s Jewish affiliation). 
 36. One politician recently invoked the Religious Test Clause to protect himself from an alleged 
theological test outside of the judicial selection context. Roy Moore, removed from office as an 
Alabama Supreme Court judge because he failed to comply with a court order, argued that the 
Religious Test Clause protected him from being “excluded for acknowledging the sovereignty of 
God.” Allie Martin, Judge Roy Moore Takes Another High Court Shot at Reclaiming Bench Seat, May 
27, 2004, at http://news.christiansunite.com/Religion_News/religion00993.shtml (last visited Jan. 14, 
2005); see also Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n of the State of Ala., No. 04-153, 2004 WL 
1732771, passim (U.S. July 29, 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 103 (2004). 
 37. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE 294–95 (1989) (quoting Senator Howell Heflin). 
 38. Drehle, supra note 8, at A6.  
 39. Id. President Bush responded to the Ninth Circuit’s original decision in Newdow v. United 
States Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding unconstitutional the practice of reciting the 
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools), by stating that the decision 
reinforced “the fact that we need common-sense judges who understand that our rights were derived 
from God. Those are the kind of judges I intend to put on the bench.” Drehle, supra note 8, at A6. 
Incidentally, this view is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rhetoric. See West Virginia State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (noting that constitutional rights are derived from the 
“consent of the governed”). Liberal political and religious groups responded to President Bush’s 
statement by arguing that the Religious Test Clause precluded Bush’s theological test. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, One Nation “Under God”: Questions 
and Answers (June 26, 2002), available at http://www.au.org/site/DocServer/One_Nation_Under_ 
God.pdf?docID=154 (last visited Jan. 14, 2005); Press Release, American Humanist Association, Bush 
Sets Religious Litmus Test for Judges (June 28, 2002), available at http://www.american 
humanist.org/press/ActionAlerts/aabushlitmus.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).  
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belief that “we derive our rights from God” in hearings before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.40  
Recent controversies in state judicial selection similarly display the 
increasing popularity of theological tests. In early 2004, Florida’s judicial 
appointment commissions screened potential judges by asking whether 
each candidate “fears God.”41 In states with elected judiciaries, special 
interest groups pressure candidates to publicly disclose their theological 
viewpoints.42 In Idaho, an interest group asked state judicial candidates 
whether they believed in the literal truth of Biblical hell and that “God 
created all the heavens, earth, creatures, plants, and man.”43 These state 
theological tests exemplify what an increased theological scrutiny of 
federal judicial candidates may look like in the future. 
D. The Role of Religiously Motivated Ideology 
Ideological positions motivated by religious affiliation or theology 
influenced many of history’s leading advocates of civil rights, economic 
justice, and world peace.44 Similarly, contemporary judicial politics and 
selection often revolve around issues about which religious believers 
greatly care.45 Such religiously motivated ideological beliefs have long 
been the subject of presidential and senatorial scrutiny.  
 40. Nomination of William H. Pryor, Jr., to be United States Circuit Judge for the Eleventh 
Circuit before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 56 (2003) (testimony of William H. 
Pryor). 
 41. Stephanie Francis Ward, Judging The Judge Candidates, Queries About Family Life, 
Religion Draw Fire in Florida County, 3 No. 3 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 3 (Jan. 23, 2004). 
 42. See, e.g., Christian Coalition of Alabama v. Cole, 355 F.3d 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(describing special interest group’s questionnaire regarding judicial candidate’s theological 
viewpoint). 
 43. Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Idaho Christian 
Coalition Grills Judicial Candidates on God, Hell, and Evolution (May 10, 2000), available at 
http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=pr&page=NewsArticle&id=6430&security=1002&news_iv_ctrl=
1465 (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) (explaining the questionnaire and quoting relevant questions); see also 
John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State 
Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 249–50 (2001) (discussing the religious nature of the 
Idaho questionnaires).  
 44. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN 84, 102, 136 (2000) (noting the 
religious motivations behind leaders in the Abolitionist, Progressive, and nuclear disarmament 
movements); Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
1009, 1012 (2002) (describing religion’s role in civil rights movement). 
 45. See supra note 3. For example, religious believers are often the most vocal advocates on 
either side of the debates on sexual orientation equality and abortion. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, 
Christians, The Bible, and Same-Sex Unions: An Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 449, 479 (2001) [hereinafter Perry, Same-Sex Unions] (discussing religious 
motivations behind opponents of same-sex unions); Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and Abortion, 
79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter Perry, Abortion] (discussing religious motivations 
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Although the distinction between religiously motivated and secularly 
motivated ideological positions is not entirely clear,46 some candidates and 
judges have expressly identified specific ideological views as religiously 
motivated.47 Examples abound where judges’ religious beliefs motivate 
their decisions on issues concerning economic justice,48 capital 
punishment,49 and criminal sentencing.50 Indeed, a judicial candidate’s 
views on abortion, capital punishment, and sexual orientation equality are 
often both issues about which religiously involved judges have strong 
religiously motivated views and the primary political litmus tests for 
whether the prospective judge will be nominated and confirmed.51
Arguably the most salient example of bipartite consideration of 
religiously motivated ideology in the recent past is the political branches’ 
constant concern over whether a candidate supports or opposes continued 
application of Roe v. Wade.52 Presidential candidates make opposition to 
behind opponents of reproductive rights). 
 46. See infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.  
 47. Aside from issues with obvious religious nexuses, religious influences on judicial 
decisionmaking are often concealed. See Scott C. Idleman, The Concealment of Religious Values in 
Judicial Decisionmaking, 91 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). Indeed, religious motivations are 
sometimes implicit in the judicial candidate’s ideological commitments to seemingly secular topics. 
See, e.g., VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD (2000) (drawing parallel between Biblical 
literalism and legal textualism); Failinger, supra note 25, at 646 (finding that religious affiliation and 
theology could affect a judge’s rhetorical style). For an example of how knowledge of a judge’s own 
religion’s history can impact their opinion-writing, see Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 
847 So.2d 331, 349–53 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (drawing allusions to Christian history). 
 48. Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices: Historical Notes and 
Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383, 395 (1998) (discussing the religious motivations for Justice Frank 
Murphy’s support for labor unions, New Deal programs, and minimum wage laws); Malvina 
Halberstam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The First Jewish Woman on the United States Supreme Court, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1441, 1454 (1998) (attributing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s commitment to 
justice to her Jewish faith).  
 49. John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 
(1998); Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305 (2004) (article 
written by federal magistrate discussing Catholic teachings on capital punishment). 
 50. Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal 
Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (finding that “religious beliefs 
exert a powerful directing influence upon the sentencing decisions of judges”); see also Garvey & 
Coney, supra note 49, at 332, 335 (finding that opposition to capital punishment may cause judges to 
be more willing to reverse a finding of guilt or make more defendant-lenient discretionary rulings). For 
an example of a district judge’s religious beliefs motivating sentencing of a televangelist, see United 
States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740–41 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing sentence because of the sentencing 
judge’s religious motivation).  
 51. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 305 (2004) 
(describing abortion and capital punishment as the primary litmus tests for both political branches); see 
also Jeffrey Bell & Frank Cannon, Bush vs. Kerry, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 9, 2004 (noting that 
Senate Democrats refused to confirm several Bush nominees because of the nominees’ views on 
abortion and sexual orientation equality). 
 52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a constitutional right of privacy protects a woman’s 
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or support for Roe a key campaign issue,53 and presidents consider a 
candidate’s views on reproductive rights paramount in deciding whom to 
nominate.54 Senators suspicious of judicial candidates’ religiously 
motivated opposition to Roe criticize and question the candidate about 
whether the candidate will follow Roe or will follow their own religiously 
motivated ideological convictions.55
II. IDEOLOGICAL TESTS VS. RELIGIOUS TESTS 
As explored above, the political branches have frequently considered 
aspects of a judicial candidate’s religion in deciding whether to nominate 
or confirm. The political branches undertake this inquiry pursuant to their 
constitutional authority to test the qualifications of judicial candidates.56 
Traditionally, the political branches consider ideology as part of the 
candidates’ qualifications for office. 
In apparent contradiction to this traditional scrutiny, the Religious Test 
Clause prohibits the political branches from requiring religious tests as 
decision whether or not to terminate her pre-viability pregnancy). 
 53. See, e.g., 2004 Presidential Debate (Oct. 8, 2004), available at 2004 WL 86881918 (debating 
what kind of judge each presidential candidate would appoint including whether the judicial candidate 
supports a woman’s right to choose); Neil A. Lewis, Presidential Candidates Differ Sharply on Judges 
They Would Appoint to Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at 28 (describing similar debate in 2000 
presidential election). 
 54. See Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal 
Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 782 (1997) (noting role of abortion debate in President 
Clinton’s nominating practices).
 55. See Levinson, Confrontation, supra note 6, at 1062–65 (exploring the questions asked and 
the respective answers of Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Kennedy); Merz, supra note 49, at 314–15 
(discussing the questions asked of Justices Brennan and Scalia). Despite its possibly dubious 
constitutionality and questionable practical efficacy, members of both parties generally agree that this 
“allegiance question” is appropriate. Sidak, supra note 6, at 10–11 (quoting Virginia Governor 
Douglas Wilder and Senator Orrin Hatch as supporting such questioning of Justice Thomas). 
Candidates commonly respond by declaring their commitment to “follow the law” regardless of their 
personal religious beliefs and some have committed to recusing themselves were their religious views 
to collide with the law. Levinson, Confrontation, supra note 6, at 1063–64; see also James L. Buckley, 
The Catholic Public Servant, 20 FIRST THINGS 18 (1992) (describing his own commitment to recuse 
himself if his religiously motivated ideology collided with precedent).  
 The allegiance question has become popular fodder for commentators’ speculations on how 
hypothetical nominees could honestly respond. See, e.g., Levinson, Jewish Justice, supra note 27, at 
2369 (describing hypothetical Orthodox Jewish nominee who believes that idolatry is condemnable); 
Rodney K. Smith, Treating Others as our Own: Professor Levinson, Friendship, Religion, and the 
Public Square, 38 TULSA L. REV. 731, 737–40 (2003) (describing questioning of a member of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints); Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the American 
Creed: Comments on Sanford Levinson’s The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: 
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 1119–27 (1990) (exploring similar questions 
vis-à-vis Quaker and “secular moralist” nominees). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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qualifications for judicial office.57 However, as I will explore in more 
depth in Parts III and IV, this apparent contradiction is merely superficial. 
The Religious Test Clause’s history suggests that its demands may be in 
accord with ideological testing of judicial candidates. The Religious Test 
Clause is not a blanket prohibition of all tests touching upon religion; 
indeed, the Clause’s scope is limited to “religious” tests and does not 
prohibit ideological ones. 
A. Ideological Tests for Judicial Office 
The constitutional mechanism for staffing the federal judiciary requires 
approval by both political branches.58 This bipartite process serves as the 
only meaningful majoritarian check on a judiciary otherwise considered 
beyond the reach of majoritarian control.59 The political branches 
traditionally fulfill their roles by establishing flexible qualifications60 
including the judicial candidate’s background, professional 
accomplishments, and—often predominately—ideology.61 Indeed, 
 57. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law. . . .”). Obviously, prior to either nomination or confirmation, Congress must create 
the relevant judicial office. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”).  
 59. Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
619, 628 (2003). The Constitution permits impeachment of federal judges, but judicial impeachment is 
a rarely invoked and “minor” congressional power. Michael Abramowicz, Impeaching Judges at the 
Fringe, 106 YALE L.J. 2293, 2294 (1997). In fact, in the past two centuries, Congress conducted a 
mere eleven judicial impeachment trials, only seven of which ended in convictions. Kristofor J. 
Hammond, Judicial Intervention in a Twenty-First Century Republic: Shuffling Deck Chairs on the 
Titanic?, 74 IND. L.J. 653, 658, 658 n.31 (1999). Experience may have proven Thomas Jefferson 
prophetic in describing judicial impeachment as a “mere scare-crow.” Id. at 658. 
 60. As opposed to several other federal offices, the Constitution does not enumerate 
qualifications for judicial office. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial 
Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 17 (2001). Rather, it implicitly allows the political 
branches to set qualifications for judicial candidates limited only by the Religious Test Clause. See 
infra notes 98–111 and accompanying text for discussion of the qualifications clauses. 
 61. Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ideology, 15 
REGENT U. L. REV. 15, 25–26 (2003) (noting emphasis on ideology over background and professional 
accomplishments). For an analysis of the qualifications the Senate assesses in judicial candidates, see 
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Nancy Staudt, The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of 
Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). A growing literature 
challenges the theoretical underpinnings of ideological scrutiny, arguing that ideology should not play 
any role—or at least not a significant one—in judicial selection decisions. See, e.g., NORMAN VIEIRA 
& LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 254 (1998) (arguing that senatorial 
consideration of ideology threatens a president’s ability to nominate whomever he pleases because 
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ideology has been the most prominent factor in judicial selection since 
President George Washington’s first Supreme Court appointment.62  
Ideological considerations generally involve assessing how the 
candidates’ views on constitutional interpretation and specific legal issues 
will impact their future judicial decisionmaking.63 Recognizing that 
judges’ ideological views may substantively affect their judicial 
decisionmaking,64 the political branches manipulate their respective roles 
presidents may not want to expend significant political capital on one nominee); Neil Richards, The 
Supreme Court Justice and “Boring” Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 401, 407 (2001) (arguing that factors 
such as “temperament, maturity, and demeanor” should play important roles because “[i]t is not 
enough to have someone who can craft a brilliant opinion in a major constitutional ruling; we need 
someone who can stay awake and who pays equal attention when the tax cases . . . are ‘droning on and 
on’”); Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (arguing that “character should be of primary importance in the judicial selection 
process, and political ideology should play a relatively minor role”). Indeed, it may be “difficult to find 
anyone who is satisfied with the way [federal judges] are appointed today.” David A. Strauss & Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Senate, The Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1491 
(1992). However, for purposes of this Note I presume that the traditional ideological scrutiny by both 
political branches and by members of both political parties will continue in the future.  
 62. Matthew D. Marcotte, Advice and Consent: A Historical Argument for Substantive Senatorial 
Involvement in Judicial Nominations, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 519 (2002) (tracing tradition 
from President George Washington through President George W. Bush). But see Lee Epstein et al., 
Borked! The New Politics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees (Washington Univ. in St. 
Louis, Working Paper, Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/Bork.html (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2005) (arguing that ideology’s role has not always been as significant as it is in modern 
judicial selection). Although presidents have tested judicial candidates’ ideologies since Washington, 
they frequently employed more indirect routes for determining how a candidate would decide cases. 
Thus, presidents sometimes looked to party identification as a proxy for an explicit ideological test. 
See infra note 65. Ideological tests for how judges would decide future cases became more explicit 
during the Reagan Administration. VIEIRA & GROSS, supra note 61, at 6–7.  
 63. Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 621 (defining ideology as “the views of a judicial candidate 
that influence his or her likely decisions as a judge” including the nominee’s preferred methods of 
constitutional interpretation and views on specific legal issues); Albert P. Melone, Judicial Discretion 
and the Senate’s Role in Judicial Selection: Questioning Supreme Court Nominees, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
557, 562 (1992) (“Ideology is the summary term describing nominee attitudes and values that are 
particularly relevant to the performance of the judicial function.”). 
 64. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case 
vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”); Richard A. Posner, What do Judges and 
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 40 (2003) 
(“[T]he conditions of judicial employment enable and induce judges to vote their personal convictions 
and policy preferences—or in a word their values.”). While ideological predisposition may not be the 
sole determinant of case outcome, empirical research indicates that ideology at least partially affects 
most judges’ decisions. Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: 
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 836–43; see also 
Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science 
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1193–94 
(2004) (finding that computer models incorporating non-doctrinal factors and political preferences out-
predict legal experts). 
 These Attitudinalist critiques have their own critics: Legalists argue that judges decide cases by 
strictly applying “the law—and not the personal politics of individual judges.” Harry T. Edwards, 
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to promote political agendas: Presidents seek to enshrine their political 
preferences by appointing ideologically likeminded judges,65 and the 
Senate asserts its role as an institutional balance by similarly testing 
candidates’ legal and political views.66 Both branches having equal power 
Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. 
Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985). Under the Legalist model, judges deduce case 
outcomes from a defined sphere of statutory and common law rules. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: 
From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the 
Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 87 (1995). Appealing to these “neutral principles” permits 
judges to decide cases impartially and without resort to ideological preferences. Frank B. Cross, 
Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 
NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 120 (1992) (“Most judges hold deeply internalized role constraints and believe 
that judgment is not politics.”). Despite its notable adherents, many consider the Legalist model as 
“serv[ing] only to rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s 
decisionmaking process.” SEGAL & SPAETH, supra, at 53. While most agree that ideology is not the 
sole criterion for judicial decisionmaking, the modern conception of law generally views law as the 
product of political society and of judges as merely some of the political actors in that process. Ruger 
et al., supra, at 1155. For discussions of motivations other than solely ideology or legal doctrine, see 
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) (arguing that judges may be 
driven partially by ideology, but are also “strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their 
goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to 
make, and the institutional context in which they act”). 
 65. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1506–07; see also Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & 
Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 
90 VA. L. REV. 301, 352 (2004) (“Presidents are entirely aware [that ideology effects judicial 
decisionmaking] and their appointment decisions are undertaken with full appreciation of it.”). As one 
blunt indicator of ideological parity between president and nominee, presidents overwhelmingly 
appoint judges of the same political party as themselves. James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal 
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 153 (2003); see also Patricia M. Wald, Random 
Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting Appellate Judges, 6 J.L. & POL. 15, 15 (1989) (noting that 
“card-carrying membership in the right political party has been a sine qua non” for both district and 
appellate nominations). Empirical studies find statistically significant relationships between political 
party and judicial ideology. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: 
A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999). 
 66. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 132–37 (1985). Protection of 
appropriate checks and balances on executive appointment power is the primary rationale asserted by 
proponents of extensive senatorial ideological inquiry. See Paul Simon, The Senate’s Role in Judicial 
Appointments, 70 JUDICATURE 55 (1986). Restricting the Senate’s ideological inquiry would permit 
the President to “mold the Court in his own image with no meaningful democratic check.” Jeff Yates 
& William Gillespie, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing The Appropriate Role of the Senate in the 
Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1062 (2001).  
 Many argue that the Constitution’s Framers intended strict senatorial scrutiny of judicial nominees 
to balance the president’s discretion in nominating judges. James E. Gauch, The Intended Role of the 
Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 365 (1989). Among the significant 
historical evidence cited in support of this proposition is Alexander Hamilton’s conception that 
senatorial scrutiny of judicial nominees would be “an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the 
President” and would prevent the president from being governed solely by “his private inclinations and 
interests.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1996). 
 Some opponents of ideological scrutiny criticize the Senate for asserting a role equivalent to the 
executive’s. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Ideology and the Confirmation of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 177, 206 (2001) (arguing that the Senate should decide whether to confirm based solely on 
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to ideologically screen judicial candidates implies that both branches bear 
equal responsibility for possible political upheaval or overemphasis on 
purely ideological considerations.67  
While some criticize the prejudicial nature of ideological scrutiny in 
the modern political environment,68 most observers consider ideology a 
constitutionally permissible and theoretically acceptable factor in judicial 
selection.69 By testing candidates’ ideological views as qualifications for 
judicial office, the political branches can together preserve an overall 
ideological balance in the federal judiciary.70 Seeking an ideological 
“competence and character”); Stephen B. Presser, Should Ideology of Judicial Nominees Matter?: Is 
the Senate’s Current Reconsideration of the Confirmation Process Justified?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
245, 273–74 (2001) (arguing that the Senate should only consider whether candidates adhere to the 
judicial philosophy favored by the president); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in Confirming 
Federal Court Judges, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 127, 141 (2001) (arguing that the Senate should not 
consider ideology). However, few critics argue that presidents should not consider ideology when 
deciding whom to nominate; indeed, restricting the president’s ability to scrutinize possible nominees 
for ideological parity would be much more difficult than attempting to restrict the Senate’s 
prerogative. Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 51, at 300 (discussing possibility of a president choosing 
judicial nominees by merit rather than political preferences). 
 67. Presidents are able to ideologically screen prospective judicial candidates without as much 
public scrutiny because deliberations occur behind closed doors as opposed to the Senate’s practice of 
holding public hearings with judicial candidates. See Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some 
Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1157 (1988) (describing history of public hearings 
in Senate dating back to 1939); see also Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. 
Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 403 (2000) (finding that the Senate has asked judicial 
candidates about their views on specific precedent since at least 1955).  
 68. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1189–91 
(1988). Criticism of ideology’s role is also prevalent in the Senate. However, some senators who 
deride consideration of ideology regarding their own party’s nominees often cite ideology as a 
legitimate consideration when blocking the opposite party’s nominees. Compare 149 CONG. REC. 
S14,533 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that senatorial consideration of 
President George W. Bush’s nominees’ ideological views is inappropriate), and Orrin G. Hatch, Save 
the Court From What?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1354 (1986) (explaining that Senate rejection of 
Reagan nominees on ideological grounds “would deny the President his constitutional prerogative and 
assert a power to select nominees that the Senate was not intended to possess”), with 144 CONG. REC. 
S6181, 6186 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (explaining that, when faced with 
Clinton nominees, “the effort to reign in judicial activism” should include “opposing potential activist 
nominees”), and 144 CONG. REC. S1970 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (refusing 
to support Clinton nominee Frederica Massiah-Jackson because of her expansive view of criminal 
defendants’ rights). 
 69. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court 
Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970); Chemerinsky, supra note 59; Albert P. Melone, The Senate’s 
Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 
JUDICATURE 68 (1991); William Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, HARV. L. REC., 
Oct. 8, 1959, at 7 (arguing that the Senate should “thoroughly inform[] itself on the judicial 
philosophy” of nominees before confirming). 
 70. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 110. A number of scholars and politicians support the goal of 
ideological balance. See, e.g., Marcia D. Greenberger, Should Ideology Matter?, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 
481, 491 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Should Ideology Matter?, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 463, 463 (2002); 
Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A19. However, liberals and 
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balance can promote legal stability while permitting political flexibility in 
responding to changing dynamics in public attitudes toward the law.71  
B. The Religious Test Clause 
The only religion clause in the unamended Constitution prohibits 
requiring “religious tests” as a “Qualification” for public office.72 Thus, 
the Religious Test Clause prevents the political branches from requiring 
“religious tests” as a “Qualification” for judicial office in exercising their 
respective responsibilities to appoint and to confirm judicial candidates. 
The Constitution’s drafters adopted the Clause as a radical break from 
European and state religious tests based on denominational affiliation and 
theological beliefs. In the intervening years, courts have distinguished 
between beliefs sufficiently “religious” and those considered too political 
to be within the Clause’s prohibition. 
1. Adoption of the Religious Test Clause 
In the centuries preceding the American Revolution, European 
governments used religious tests to preserve the established church’s 
political power.73 European tests typically required positive assertions of 
denominational affiliation or theological beliefs as a prerequisite for 
conservatives alike criticize ideological balance as an improper goal. Compare Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1073, 1106 
(2001) (arguing that ideological balance is an inappropriate goal because it would have required 
Roosevelt to appoint opponents of the New Deal and Johnson to appoint segregationists), with Stephen 
B. Presser, Some Thoughts on our Present Discontents and Duties: The Cardinal, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., the Unborn, the Senate, and Us, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 124–25 (2003) (arguing that 
the goal of ideological balance is merely pretext for liberal substantive biases in the “culture wars”). 
 71. In their critique of an “ideologically balanced” judiciary, Professors Balkin and Levinson 
imply that appointing an ideologically representative judiciary would retard legal progress on 
important issues of civil and constitutional rights. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 70, at 1106. 
However, the political process from which presidents and senators emerge may safeguard the judiciary 
against such problems by ensuring that the political branches will appoint and confirm judges as 
politically forward-looking as the electorate. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-making in a Democracy: 
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). However, the process 
alone cannot ensure that judges with lifetime appointments remain throughout their tenure as 
progressive as the political branches might prefer. 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 73. Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected 
Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the United 
States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 951 (1996). As the court explained in Rogers v. Common 
Council of City of Buffalo, 25 N.E. 274 (N.Y. 1890), “[d]eclarations, oaths, and tests, as a condition for 
holding office, had been frequently resorted to by the parliament of Great Britain for the purpose of 
promoting the prosperity of one religion, or insuring the downfall of another.” Id. at 278. 
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holding public office.74 Early state constitutions mimicked the breadth of 
the European tests: the thirteen states with religious tests limited public 
office on the basis of denomination or theology.75 Some constitutional 
provisions reserved public office for Protestants76 or Christians.77 Others 
 74. Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the 
Article VI Religious Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261, 263 (1996). Starting in 1673, English law 
required individuals to swear that they did not believe in transubstantiation prior to holding public 
office and members of Parliament were prohibited from voting if they did not forswear papal 
authority, belief in transubstantiation, and the veneration of Mary or the Saints. Michael W. 
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2176 (2003). 
 75. Thirteen states imposed religious tests: Ten states directly imposed religious tests through 
constitutional provisions and three mandated religious tests through more indirect methods. The ten 
states that imposed religious tests in their early state constitutions are Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and 
Vermont. See infra notes 76–81. 
 Connecticut, New York, and Virginia refrained from constitutionally mandating religious 
qualifications for public office as such. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 213 
(1989). However, all three states placed indirect religious restrictions on holding office. Connecticut 
statutorily required professions of theological beliefs to hold public office and constitutionally required 
public officeholders to swear an oath with the appendage, “So help [me] God.” See THE FIRST LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 67 (John D. Cushing ed., 1982) (describing statute codified in 1784); 
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. X, § 1 (1965), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 546 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 
1993) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (prescribing oath of office). The New 
York Constitution limited naturalization to non-Catholics and adopted legislation preventing Catholics 
from serving in public office. MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 133 n.33 (1984) (noting 
that the New York Constitution “required persons born outside the United States to take a 
naturalization oath renouncing all allegiance to ‘every foreign King, Prince, Potentate, and State, in all 
matters ecclesiastical as well as civil’” in hopes of limiting papal influence); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU 
ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 94 (1964) (discussing New York legislation 
rendering Catholics ineligible for public office). If Virginians elected a non-Christian, “he would have 
had to serve from jail” because Virginia criminally punished public utterance of non-Christian views 
and operated a state-supported Anglican church until 1786. Bradley, supra note 6, at 683. 
 Only Rhode Island refrained from imposing a religious test for public office. In its first state 
constitution, Rhode Island expressly disavowed religious tests. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 3, 
reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3222 (“[N]o man shall be . . . 
disqualified from holding any office; nor otherwise suffer on account of his religious belief . . . .”). 
Rhode Island did require office holders to swear “[s]o help [me] God” as part of the oath of office. See 
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. IX, § 3, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 
3231–32. 
 76. Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Vermont limited public office to Protestants. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI (1789), reprinted in 2 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 779 (preventing from service those not “of the 
Protestant religion”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2 (1793), reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2460–63 (requiring Protestant religion for senators, representatives, 
and the state president); N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2 (1793), reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2477, 2479 (requiring Protestant religion for senators and 
representatives); N.J. CONST. of 1776, pt. XIX (1844) reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2597–98 (limiting office to “all persons professing a belief in the 
faith of any protestant sect”); supra note 75 (describing New York’s constitutional and statutory 
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required public servants to profess beliefs in theological concepts such as 
the Christian Trinity,78 Divine inspiration of the Christian Bible,79 an 
eternal system of rewards and punishments,80 or metaphysical attributes of 
a theistic God.81  
prohibitions on non-Protestants holding public office); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. XXXII (1835), 
reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2793 (preventing from 
public office those “who shall deny . . . the truth of the Protestant religion”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 
III, art. XII, art. XIII (1895), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, 
at 3249–52 (requiring Protestant religion for governor, lieutenant governor, privy council, senators, 
and representatives); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XII (1793), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3757 (limiting office to those who “profess the protestant 
religion”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § IX, (1786), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3743 (limiting office to those who “profess the protestant 
religion”).  
 77. Maryland and Massachusetts limited public office to any “Christians.” MD. CONST. of 1776, 
pt. LV (1792), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 1700 
(requiring any office holder to declare “his belief in the Christian religion”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, 
pt. 2, ch. VI, art. I (amended 1821), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 75, at 1908 (requiring all elected officials to swear that they “believe the Christian religion, and 
have a firm persuasion of its truth”).  
 78. Connecticut and Delaware required belief in the Trinity. THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT, supra note 74, at 67 (statute codified in 1784 that denied public office to anyone who 
denied “any One of the Persons in the Holy Trinity to be God”); DEL. CONST. of 1776, Art. 22 (1792), 
reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 566 (requiring all elected 
and appointed public officials to declare that “I . . . profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ 
His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore”). 
 79. Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont required belief in Divine 
inspiration of the Christian Bible. THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 74, at 
67 (statute codified in 1784 that denied public office to anyone who denied “the Holy Scriptures of the 
Old and New-Testament to be of Divine Authority”); DEL. CONST. of 1776, Art. 22 (1792), reprinted 
in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 566 (requiring office-holders to 
declare that “I do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by 
divine inspiration”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. XXXII (1835), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2793 (requiring office-holders to believe in “the divine authority 
either of the Old or New Testaments”); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 10 (1790), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3085 (requiring profession that “I do acknowledge the 
Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be given by Divine inspiration”); VT. CONST. of 1786, 
ch. II, § XII (1793), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3757 
(requiring officeholders to give oath declaring that “I do acknowledge the scriptures of the old and 
new testament to be given by divine inspiration”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § IX (1786), reprinted 
in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3743 (requiring officeholders to give 
oath declaring that “I do acknowledge the scriptures of the old and new testament to be given by 
divine inspiration”).  
 80. Pennsylvania and Vermont required belief that God was the “rewarder of the good and 
punisher of the wicked.” PA. CONST. of 1776, § 10 (1790), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3085; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § IX (1786), reprinted in 6 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3743; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XII 
(1793), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3757; VT. CONST. 
of 1777, ch. II, § IX (1786), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, 
at 3743.  
 81. Connecticut, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont required belief that God possessed 
certain qualities. THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 74, at 67 (statute 
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In light of the European and state tests, the Religious Test Clause’s 
inclusion in the Constitution signaled a significant reversal of course in the 
new Republic’s relationship with religious tests.82 Charles Pickney 
originally proposed the Clause as “a provision the world will expect . . . in 
the establishment of a system founded on republican principles and in an 
age so liberal and enlightened as the present.”83 While the enlightened 
inclusion of the Clause was a significant departure from common practice, 
the Constitutional Convention records leave little explanation for its 
inclusion in the Constitution.84 The delegates apparently “never considered 
the want of a religious test—that grand engine of persecution in every 
tyrant’s hand.”85  
During ratification, the Clause garnered much more attention than at 
the Philadelphia Convention. Antifederalists argued that religious tests 
were necessary for preventing non-Christians86 from holding public office, 
and proposed tests in place of the Religious Test Clause.87 The proposed 
oaths resembled the earlier European and state oaths, requiring public 
codified in 1784 that denied public office to anyone who believed “that there are more Gods than One” 
or denied “the Being of God”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. XXXII (1835), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2793 (requiring belief in “the being of God”); PA. 
CONST. of 1776, § 10 (1790), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, 
at 3085 (requiring belief that God is the “the creator and governor of the universe”); VT. CONST. of 
1786, ch. II, § XII (1793), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 
3757 (requiring belief in “one God, the Creator and Governor of the universe”); VT. CONST. of 1777, 
ch. II, § IX (1786), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3743 
(requiring belief in “one God, the Creator and Governor of the universe”). 
 82. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1474 (1990) (describing the Clause as a “dramatic departure from 
prevailing practice”). 
 83. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 122 (Max Farrand ed., 1966); see 
also ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, NO RELIGIOUS TEST 5 (1987). 
 84. Bradley, supra note 6, at 690. Luther Martin, a Maryland delegate, commented that the 
Convention adopted the Clause “by a great majority . . . and without much debate.” 3 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 227 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). Roger Sherman’s observation 
that the Clause was “unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a sufficient security [against] such 
tests” is the only recorded debate from the Convention. Id. at 484. 
 85. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 75, at 107. The vote tally indicates widespread support for the 
Clause: North Carolina was the only delegation opposed, while Maryland and Connecticut delegates 
divided. Id.  
 86. SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS 29 (2004) (finding that “[t]he opposition to article 6 
frequently took an anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic tone” and describing one worried critic at the 
Massachusetts convention as commenting that the Religious Test Clause would permit “a Turk, a Jew, 
a Roman Catholic, and what is worse than all, a Universalist” to be President); see also Lee J. Strang, 
The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181, 225 (2002) (describing 
motivations to prevent non-Christians and those who “did not believe in an afterlife” from holding 
public office). 
 87. Strang, supra note 86, at 225. 
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servants to swear devotion88 to a theistic deity89 who rewarded the good 
and punished the wicked.90  
Rather than proposing an actual religious test, the South Carolina 
ratifying convention offered a formal amendment to insert the word 
“other” between “no” and “religious” in Article VI.91 Supporters of this 
proposal thought that the existence of any oath implied that officeholders 
must believe in God and eternal systems of rewards and punishments.92 
They later proposed the same amendment to Article VI in both the House 
and the Senate during the first congressional session claiming that 
omitting “other” in the original Constitution was a “mere clerical error.”93
These proposals ultimately failed, and the Federalists prevailed by 
arguing that the tests were “useless, counterproductive, and 
unnecessary.”94 The Clause’s supporters successfully defended it as an 
important protection against political domination by the majority 
denomination.95 Oliver Ellsworth responded to Antifederalist doomsday 
arguments that the Clause would open the doors of public office to Turks, 
 88. A New Test, 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
588 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (originally published in the New Haven Gazette, Jan. 31, 1788) 
(proposing test including swearing to devote oneself to the service of God).  
 89. William Williams to the Printer, in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 588, 589 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (originally published in the American 
Mercury, Feb. 11, 1788) (proposing test requiring belief in “one living and true God, the creator and 
supreme Governor of the world”).  
 90. The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 770, 771 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (originally published 
in the Virginia Independent Chronicle, April 30, 1787) (proposing test requiring “a belief in the one 
only true God, who is the rewarder of the good, and the punishment of the evil”). 
 91. Bradley, supra note 6, at 698. Vermont tried a similar strategy in its own constitution. In the 
Vermont Constitutions of 1786 and 1777, public officials had to swear allegiance to Protestantism and 
swear belief in the divine inspiration of the Christian Bible, that God rewarded the good and punished 
the wicked, and that God created and governed the universe. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XII (1793), 
reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3757; VT. CONST. of 1777, 
ch. II, § IX (1786), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3743. 
However, following those religious tests, the constitutions prohibited any other religious test: “And no 
further or other religious test shall ever hereafter be required of any civil officer or magistrate, in this 
State.” VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XII (1793), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3757; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § IX (1786), reprinted in 6 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 3743. 
 92. Bradley, supra note 6, at 698; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 55 
(1988) (finding that “some of the ratifiers considered the oath [prescribed by Article VI] to be a 
genuine religious oath . . . . [itself requiring] ‘a direct appeal to . . . God’”) (emphasis in original).  
 93. Bradley, supra note 6, at 698 n.146.  
 94. Id. at 698.  
 95. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
1071, 1092–93 (2002). This might have resulted from a selfish empathy manifested in a fear by 
members of one religious affiliation that they might become the victim of a religious test. Levinson, 
Confrontation, supra note 6, at 1051. 
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Jews, Roman Catholics, pagans, deists, heathens, and Muslims by 
describing the Clause as a rejection of the “indignity” of English tests that 
discriminated between members of Protestant denominations in favor of 
Anglicans.96 Edmund Randolph agreed that the Clause was necessary to 
ensure sect equality:  
[O]fficers . . . are to swear that they will support this constitution, 
yet they are not bound to support one mode of worship, or to adhere 
to one particular sect. It puts all sects on the same footing. A man of 
abilities and character, of any sect whatever, may be admitted to any 
office of public trust under the United States.97
These early debates indicate that the purpose for including the 
Religious Test Clause in the Constitution was to prevent the government 
from implementing denominational or theological requirements for 
holding public office. Tests on the basis of ideological views were not to 
be affected by the Clause’s inclusion. 
2. No Religious Test as a “Qualification” 
The text and structure of the Constitution indicate that status-based 
religious qualifications are impermissible. However, the Constitution 
leaves the relevant decisionmaker free to assess other substantive criteria 
in deciding whether to nominate or confirm a judicial candidate.  
The Constitution requires all “judicial Officers” to “be bound by Oath 
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever 
be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United 
 96. Bradley, supra note 6, at 696–97; see also Strang, supra note 86, at 225 (“[Antifederalists] 
derided the exclusion as allowing non-Protestants or non-Christians or even non-theists to gain office 
in the new national government. . . .”). One Antifederalist argued that a religious test should be 
adopted rather than the Clause because the Clause would permit Catholics to hold public office. 
Bradley, supra note 6, at 700. He further explained, “[t]here is a disqualification, [for Catholics] I 
believe, in every state in the Union—it ought to be so in this system.” Id. (quoting 4 ELLIOTT’S 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 215 (1901) (speech of William Lancaster)). Similar 
sentiments recurred in later arguments by supporters of religious tests that tests are “beacon[s] to 
aspirants for office, as an axiom that we prize Religion, and [that] tells the world we are a Christian 
people.” BORDEN, supra note 75, at 46 (quoting delegate to North Carolina constitutional convention 
in 1835).  
 97. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 310 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
Iredell also articulated this concern: “[Article VI] is calculated to secure universal religious liberty, by 
putting all sects on a level—the only way to prevent persecution.” Bradley, supra note 6, at 709; see 
also John Witte, Jr., Religious Rights in the Founding Era, in RIGHTS IN THE FOUNDING ERA (Barry 
Shain ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 13–14, on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=480164 (noting the role of sect equality in 
adopting the Religious Test Clause). 
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States.”98 By using the word “but,” the Constitution’s drafters “considered 
the constitutional oath a substitute for the religious tests the colonists were 
familiar with under the English established church.”99 As explored above, 
the earlier religious tests required membership in a particular religious 
denomination or profession of theological beliefs.100
The Constitution’s drafters prescribed status-based “qualifications” for 
several federal offices.101 The word “qualifications” appears only three 
times in the Constitution’s text102 and all three offices for which the 
Constitution specifically enumerates qualifications rely on the relevant 
individual’s membership in a particular class of citizens: age;103 
citizenship;104 residency;105 or holding other offices.106  
 98. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. For a thoughtful analysis of oaths in general, see LEVINSON, 
supra note 92, at 99–107. Providing religious believers the option of affirming their support for the 
Constitution rather than swearing an oath echoes the principle expressed in the Clause that potential 
federal judges should not be forced to swear religious allegiance.  
 The Religious Test Clause is the only explicit exception to the oath requirement. In Ex parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), the attorney for the United States noted that the Framers 
included the Clause “[s]imply because . . . [they] knew that if the exception was not put in the 
instrument, there would be the ability to require a religious test.” Id. at 355. 
 99. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1984) (internal 
emphasis omitted). 
 100. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (providing qualifications for serving in the House of 
Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (providing qualifications for serving in the Senate); U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (providing qualifications for serving as President). The Constitution does not 
provide specific qualifications for federal judges. See Epstein, Knight & Shvetsova, supra note 60, at 
17. 
 102. Other than the Religious Test Clause, electors must have the qualifications required in the 
relevant state legislature, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”), and each 
House of Congress judges the qualifications of its own members, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each 
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members. . . .”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring a minimum age of twenty-five as a qualification for 
serving in the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (requiring a minimum age of 
thirty as a qualification for serving in the Senate); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (requiring a minimum 
age of thirty-five as a qualification for serving as President). 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring United States citizenship for at least seven years as a 
qualification for serving in the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (requiring 
United States citizenship for at least nine years as a qualification for serving in the House of 
Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (requiring natural born citizenship in the United States 
or citizenship at the time of the adoption of the Constitution as a qualification for serving as President).  
 105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring residence in the state represented as a qualification for 
serving in the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (requiring residence in the state 
represented as a qualification for serving in the Senate); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (requiring United 
States residency for at least fourteen years as a qualification for serving as President).  
 106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (providing as a qualification for both Representatives and 
Senators that they shall not be appointed to other offices or hold other offices while being a member of 
either House). In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that individuals  
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United 
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In contrast to the status-based qualifications, the Constitution provides 
separate selection mechanisms with broad discretion to consider 
substantive criteria.107 Within each of the prescribed selection 
mechanisms, the Constitution provides the relevant decisionmaker—
whether the voting public,108 the State legislature,109 the Electoral 
College,110 or the President and Senate together111—discretion in deciding 
whether to elect, nominate, or confirm based on any substantive criteria. 
The only constitutional limitations on the decisionmaker’s prerogative to 
consider all substantive criteria are the status-based limitations of the 
qualifications clauses—including the Religious Test Clause.  
3. Interpretation of the Religious Test Clause 
The case law interpreting the Religious Test Clause is not extensive 
and the Supreme Court’s few invocations of the Clause provide little 
guidance to its contemporary scope.112 The Court commonly refers to the 
Clause in largely unhelpful rhetorical flourishes,113 decides cases under the 
States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
 107. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing selection mechanism for members of the 
House of Representatives), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (providing qualifications for members of 
the House of Representatives); compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing selection mechanism 
for members of the Senate), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3 (providing qualifications for members of 
the Senate); compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3 (providing selection mechanism for presidency), 
with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (providing qualifications for presidency). 
 108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for election to the House of Representatives by 
vote of the “People of the several States”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for election to the 
Senate by popular vote). 
 109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for election to the Senate by the appointment of 
the state legislature). The Seventeenth Amendment replaced the appointment of Senators by state 
legislatures with popular elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
 110. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3 (providing for election of the President and Vice 
President by the Electoral College). 
 111. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for selection of “Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States” by 
presidential nomination and Senate confirmation). 
 112. State courts sometimes apply their state constitutions’ religious test clauses. See State v. 
Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 218 (Kan. 2001); Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (Md. 1965); Sch. 
Dist. of Hartington v. Neb. State Bd. of Educ., 195 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Neb. 1972); Wolf v. Sundquist, 
955 S.W.2d 626, 631–32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1988). 
 113. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my view, the Religion Clauses—the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Establishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause . . . all speak with one voice on this point: Absent the 
most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or benefits.”); 
Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 44 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/7
p1129 Calvert book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE 1153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Amendment that it could have addressed under the Religious Test 
Clause,114 and analyzes the Clause’s application in a vague and conclusory 
manner.  
However, the Court has made clear that the Clause prohibits only tests 
that are, in some substantive way, “religious” and that it does not prohibit 
all tests that in any way touch upon religion or religiously motivated 
political views. This is evident in Torcaso v. Watkins,115 where the Court 
decided the constitutionality of a state oath requiring officeholders to 
declare a belief in “the existence of God.”116 Warning against “the 
historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious 
beliefs”117 by requiring profession of “a belief in some particular kind of 
religious concept,”118 the Court found the oath an unconstitutional 
invasion of freedom of belief and religion.119 While identifying “existence 
of God” as within the Clause’s prohibition, Torcaso gave no indication as 
to what other kinds of religiously related beliefs government could require 
(“Test oaths and religious qualification for office . . . . [are] things none devoted to our great tradition 
of religious liberty would think of bringing back.”); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) 
(noting only that a “test oath is abhorrent to our tradition”).  
 114. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding Tennessee’s prohibition on clergy 
as public officials unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause because it conditioned the right to 
free exercise of religion on the surrender of a member of the clergy’s right to seek public office). 
Likewise, lower federal courts often resolve cases under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses that 
may be appropriately addressed under the Religious Test Clause. See, e.g., Voswinkel v. City of 
Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588, 595–97 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (finding that religious affiliation requirement 
for public office was a religious test and therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause). 
For an example of an analogous situation in a state court, see State v. Fuller, 812 A.2d 389, 407 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. 2002) (finding that the state’s attempt to prevent individuals from serving as jurors 
because they were “particularly ‘devout’ or ‘demonstrative’ in their faith based on either a religious 
calling or a manifestation of religious convictions based on attire” was unconstitutional under the Free 
Exercise Clause).  
 115. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 116. Id. at 495. 
 117. Id. at 494. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 494–96. Despite discussing the Religious Test Clause and the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses, the Court was curiously vague about which constitutional provision the religious test 
violated. However, the Court indicated that the Religious Test Clause did not control its decision. See 
id. at 489 n.1 (explaining, without identifying constitutional grounds for the decision, that the Court 
need not incorporate Article VI to apply to state governments because the judgment is on “other 
grounds”). While likely unenforceable under Torcaso, some states still include religious tests for 
public office in their state constitutions. See, e.g., Gary R. Govert, Something There is That Doesn’t 
Love a Wall: Reflections on the History of North Carolina’s Religious Test for Public Office, 64 N.C. 
L. REV. 1071 (1986) (exploring North Carolina’s constitutional prohibition on “any person who shall 
deny the being of Almighty God” from serving in public office). 
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of its officials prior to employment.120 In American Communications 
Association v. Douds,121 the Court implicitly recognized the limited scope 
of “religious” tests in summarily concluding that profession of disbelief in 
communism was not sufficiently “religious” to be within the proper 
meaning of the Clause.122  
While Torcaso and Douds sketch the outer boundaries in distinguishing 
between religious and non-religious tests, lower federal and state courts 
find little guidance in the Supreme Court’s interpretations and express 
confusion as to the Clause’s proper scope.123 This confusion has led lower 
federal, state, and military courts to disagree over whether discrimination 
on the basis of “religious beliefs” violates the Clause.124 This confusion, 
the Clause’s rare invocation, and the Court’s expansive readings of the 
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, led Professor Laurence Tribe to 
conclude that the Religious Test Clause is “now of little independent 
significance.”125 Despite such concerns, the recent debates over proper 
application of the Clause to judicial selection indicate that the Clause 
retains significant importance in at lease some areas and “[i]t cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without 
effect.”126
 120. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 716–18 (discussing the Court’s vague standard elucidated in 
Torcaso). Likewise, state courts often analyze religious test cases through petitio principii reasoning. 
See, e.g., State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 289 (Tenn. 2002) (“Religious tests probe religious beliefs.”). 
 121. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
 122. Id. at 414–15. Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court found that a public official’s decision 
to not comply with a court order was not a religious test in violation of the Alabama Constitution’s 
Religious Test Clause. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n of State of Ala., No. 1030398, 2004 WL 
922668, at **8–9 (Ala. Apr. 30, 2004). 
 123. See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 729 (D. Idaho 1981) (acknowledging that “it is far 
from clear what [the Religious Test Clause’s] true scope is or whether it would directly limit the use of 
religious affiliation as a basis for [judicial] disqualification”). 
 124. Compare United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 646 (Air Force C.M.R. 1976) (finding that the 
Religious Test Clause permits inquiry into “religious beliefs” but not religious affiliation), rev’d on 
other grounds, 4 M.J. 118 (C.M.A. 1977), with Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 476 n.12 (Tex. Ct. 
Crim. App. 1994) (“The discriminatory classification of individuals based upon their religious belief is 
. . . a religious test.”), and Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. 1997) (holding that a state 
statute requiring profession of “So help me God” at conclusion of oath of office for public notary 
violated the Religious Test Clause).  
 125. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155 n.1 (2d ed. 1988). 
 126. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 144 (1803) (spelling corrected); see also Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (“[R]eal effect should be given to all the words [the 
Constitution] uses.”); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884) (noting that it would be 
inappropriate to assume that “any part” of the constitution is “superfluous”). 
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III. PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP AND POLITICAL DEBATE 
A. The Religious Test Clause’s Scope  
Until recently, political leaders and commentators largely ignored the 
Religious Test Clause.127 The scarce scholarly commentary applying the 
Clause to judicial selection generally assumes that the Religious Test 
Clause prohibits inquiry into a candidate’s religious affiliation and 
theology.128 However, there is sharp division in both political and 
academic circles over whether the Clause prohibits considering a 
candidate’s religiously motivated ideology.  
The debate over religiously motivated ideology reached its apex in 
2003 when the Senate refused to confirm some judicial candidates due in 
part to the candidates’ religiously motivated ideological views.129 Several 
senators opposed some of President Bush’s judicial nominees because the 
 127. See supra notes 20–55 and accompanying text. 
 128. Levinson, Confrontation, supra note 6, at 1072–73 (finding that refusing to confirm an 
atheist because of his or her rejection of theism “brings one perilously close to the exaction of a test 
oath that is barred by article VI”); Sidak, supra note 6, at 15 (finding the Clause to prohibit inquiry 
into a nominee’s “religious sect or the intensity of his religious devotion”).  
 For similar conclusory assumptions in the context of judicial disqualification and general judicial 
decisionmaking, see In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004) (assuming without 
discussion that considering religious affiliation of a judge in a judicial disqualification motion would 
violate the Religious Test Clause); Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 400 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (order of Noonan, J.) (finding that motion asking Judge Noonan to recuse himself because 
of his Catholic affiliation and theological objection to abortion would violate “the principle embedded 
in Article VI”); Jake Garn & Lincoln C. Oliphant, Disqualification of Federal Judges under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(a): Some Observations on and Objections to an Attempt by the United States Department of 
Justice to Disqualify a Judge on the Basis of his Religion and Church Position, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 54 (1981) (finding that Article VI raises two points: ensuring that Catholics and atheists can 
serve in public office and precluding inquiry into a judge’s theology); Douglas Laycock, The 
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23 (finding that, in the context of judicial 
decisionmaking, the Clause protects justices from inquiry into their “personal religiosity”).  
 129. Three of the most controversial nominations include: Leon Holmes, a Catholic, to the Eastern 
District of Arkansas; Charles Pickering, a Baptist, to the Fifth Circuit; and William Pryor, a Catholic, 
to the Eleventh Circuit. See John Cornyn, Restoring Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process, 8 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 13–20 (2003) (discussing the nominations of Holmes and Pryor); 149 CONG. 
REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist) (criticizing opposition to nominations 
of Pickering and Pryor). After failing to secure Senate confirmation, President Bush granted recess 
appointments to Pickering and Pryor. Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate for Second Time, Bush Seats 
Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A1. In his second term, President Bush renominated Pryor; 
Pickering retired. Carl Huse, Bush Renominates as Judges 7 Whom Democrats Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 2005, at A12; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Tries Again on Court Choices Stalled in Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at A1. The Senate finally confirmed Holmes after a contentious debate. See Neil 
A. Lewis, After Fight, Senate Agrees to Bush’s Choice for Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A18. 
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senators believed that the nominees’ ideological views were too extreme to 
merit lifetime appointment.130  
Senators supportive of the nominations argued that opposition based on 
the candidates’ ideological views on abortion, sexual orientation equality, 
and gender equality was an unconstitutional religious test because the 
candidates’ views on those issues were religiously motivated.131 Senators 
Orrin Hatch and John Cornyn argued that the Religious Test Clause 
prohibits refusing to confirm a candidate because of their religiously 
motivated ideology.132 Senator Cornyn further argued that voting against 
the candidates would violate the Religious Test Clause because the 
candidates’ views align with their respective denominations’ official 
doctrines.133
Professor Eugene Volokh responded by arguing that, if considering 
ideology is proper, then “it must be proper regardless of whether the 
candidate’s ideology flows from his religion.”134 In Volokh’s view, 
discriminating against an anti-Roe judicial candidate is discrimination 
because of ideology, not discrimination because of religion.135  
Although frequent references to the Clause color both sides of the 
debate, there is a vivid lack of consensus regarding the Clause’s 
contemporary application,136 and neither side has adequately explored the 
 130. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S10,457 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement by Sen. Kennedy) 
(“[Nominee William Pryor’s] views are at the extreme of legal thinking.”). 
 131. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S1966 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2002) (statement by Sen. Hatch) 
(discussing religious motivations for Pryor’s abortion views and arguing that an “abortion litmus test” 
is effectively a “religious test”); 148 CONG. REC. S1968 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2002) (statement by Sen. 
Reid) (defending from critics who argued that senators opposed Pickering’s nomination because of 
Pickering’s Baptist affiliation); Orrin Hatch, Letter, Abortion Stances Based in Religion, ROLL CALL, 
Sept. 8, 2003 (arguing that religious opposition to abortion is a religious test). 
 Much of the debate over Judge Holmes’s confirmation focused on his previously published views 
on gender equality. Pryor’s Example Bears on Holmes Controversy, MOBILE REGISTER, July 5, 2004; 
see also Ralph G. Neas, People for the American Way, Leon Holmes Should Not be Confirmed to 
Federal Bench, at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_439.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) (criticizing 
Holmes’s nomination because of his views on gender equality). Whether Holmes’s stance on gender 
equality is appropriately categorized as a theological belief or an ideological view motivated by his 
religion is not clear because they could be completely unrelated to his future judicial decisionmaking.  
 132. See 148 CONG. REC. S1966 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2002) (statement by Sen. Hatch) (arguing that 
the Religious Test Clause prohibits testing of ideological beliefs if they are religiously motivated); 
Cornyn, supra note 129, at 19. 
 133. Cornyn, supra note 129, at 19. 
 134. Eugene Volokh, Religion and Ideology, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 20, 2003), at 
http://volokh.com/2003_04_20_volokh_archive.html#200180354 (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Compare 149 CONG. REC. S10,463 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin) 
(discussing history of Religious Test Clause), with 148 CONG. REC. S1966 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2002) 
(statement by Sen. Hatch) (arguing that Religious Test Clause prohibits testing of ideological beliefs if 
they are religiously motivated), and Hugh Hewitt, The Catholic Test: Two Hundred Years After the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/7
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Clause’s scope within the particular context of judicial selection and the 
traditional sphere of ideological inquiry.  
B. Judicial Remedy for Violations 
Ancillary to the debate over the Clause’s proper scope are questions 
about whether the Religious Test Clause provides an enforcement 
mechanism for prospective judges excluded from nomination or 
confirmation because of their religion. As a preliminary matter, alleged 
violations of the Religious Test Clause in the judicial selection context 
may be nonjusticiable political questions. Under the political question 
doctrine, federal courts may not decide cases wherein they would be 
forced to decide an issue despite “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”137 The 
Constitution grants the political branches authority to prescribe and judge 
the qualifications of judicial candidates.138 In light of these textual 
commitments to the political branches, the Religious Test Clause’s 
application in the judicial selection process would seemingly be a 
nonjusticiable political question. However, the Supreme Court has found 
several cases involving the qualifications clauses justiciable,139 and one 
federal court implied that an alleged violation of the Religious Test Clause 
could be a justiciable controversy in the appropriate circumstances.140  
Even if Religious Test Clause cases are justiciable, there is probably no 
judicially enforceable punishment for either a president or a senator 
Framers Renounced Them, Senate Democrats Have Reinvented the Test Act, DAILY STANDARD, Aug. 
5, 2003, at A06. 
 137. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Baker Court announced six alternative tests for 
determining whether a particular case presents a political question:  
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
Id. 
 138. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 139. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486, 521 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131 (1966). 
 140. Newdow v. Eagen, 309 F. Supp.2d 29, 38 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing Religious Test Clause 
challenge to the House’s and the Senate’s selection of theist chaplains for lack of standing because 
hiring congressional officers is an internal practice not involving exercise of congressional power). 
Whether Religious Test Clause cases in judicial selection are justiciable is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
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violating the Religious Test Clause within the judicial selection context.141 
After evaluating a variety of possible rules and remedies, Gregory Sidak 
discussed three potential punishment solutions.142 First, candidates refused 
nomination or confirmation because of a Religious Test Clause violation 
could state an implied cause of action in federal court.143 However, Sidak 
dismissed an implied cause of action under the Religious Test Clause as 
unworkable and ineffective.144 Second, a nominee whose confirmation 
failed because of a Religious Test Clause violation could receive 
automatic senatorial confirmation.145 Sidak believed that this proposal 
could be unconstitutional because it would prevent the Senate from 
actually confirming judges, thereby subverting the Advice and Consent 
Clause.146 Third, the Senate could punish individual members for their 
violation of the Religious Test Clause.147 Sidak found individual 
punishment the most viable remedy but recognized it as “probably naïve” 
and likely ineffective.148  
Whether violations are justiciable and whether there is a judicially 
enforceable remedy are of little consequence in determining the 
appropriate scope of the Religious Test Clause in the judicial selection 
context. The Constitution speaks to all branches of government and both 
the President and the Senate are obligated to follow its dictates.149  
IV. APPLYING THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE TO JUDICIAL SELECTION 
The tension between the political branches’ traditional consideration of 
ideology and the Religious Test Clause suggests that some topics of a 
judicial candidate’s religious associations and views should be 
impermissible qualities upon which neither presidents nor senators should 
base their judicial selection decisions.150 In this Part, I attempt to resolve 
that tension by balancing the appropriate breadth of the Religious Test 
Clause against the policies underlying inquiry into a candidate’s 
 141. Sidak, supra note 6, at 40. 
 142. Id. at 40–49. 
 143. Id. at 40–41. 
 144. Id. at 41–42. 
 145. Id. at 43–45. 
 146. Id. at 45–46. 
 147. Id. at 46–47.  
 148. Id. at 47–49. 
 149. Cf. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (refusing to “assume that 
Congress is not alert to its constitutional responsibilities”). 
 150. Cf. Freund, supra note 67, at 1163 (“The difficulty of drawing lines between appropriate and 
inappropriate interrogation . . . suggests at least that committee rules be adopted that would provide 
senators and nominees with some guidelines. . . .”). 
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substantive ideology. The Religious Test Clause and the judicial selection 
process should function in tandem to ensure that the political branches will 
not require denominational or theological qualifications for judicial office 
while permitting inquiry into judicial candidates’ religiously motivated 
ideologies.151
A. Religious Affiliation and Theology 
The Religious Test Clause prevents the political branches from 
requiring judicial candidates to affiliate with a favored religious group or 
profess a theological belief as a qualification for office. Previous 
scholarship generally assumes that the Clause prohibits discriminating 
between candidates on the basis of denomination or theological beliefs 
without extended discussion, and the Clause would seemingly be void of 
any substantive weight if religious affiliation and theology were not within 
its prohibition of “religious tests.”152 Although the Clause’s proscription of 
discrimination based on religious affiliation and theology may be obvious, 
exploring the Clause’s history and the policies underlying the judicial 
selection process confirms this traditional assumption.  
Denominational prejudice and theological bigotry motivated the 
Framers to include the Religious Test Clause in the Constitution. Indeed, 
the Clause was the Framers’ response to the European and state religious 
tests, which limited public office to members of the preferred sect and 
theological beliefs.153 Such status-based discrimination against members 
of a particular religious faith could resurface if denominational or 
theological considerations played a significant role in contemporary 
judicial selection.154
 151. Whether the statutory oath required of federal judges violates the Religious Test Clause is 
beyond the scope of this Note. The oath requires all federal judges to swear an oath including the 
statement “[s]o help me God.” 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (requiring 
similar oath for all federal officers except the President). The Supreme Court of South Carolina found 
that a similar oath violated the Religious Test Clause. Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. 
1997) (holding that a state statute requiring profession of “So help me God” at the conclusion of an 
oath of office for public notary violated the Religious Test Clause). For an argument that the drafters 
of the Constitution omitted religious references from the presidential oath in Article II, section 1, 
clause 8, in order to avoid conflict with the Religious Test Clause, see Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. 
Emmerich, The Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1630 n.298 (1989).  
 152. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 879 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing hypothetical religious affiliation test in light of the Religious Test 
Clause); Case Comment, Required Chapel Attendance at Military Academies Held Valid: Anderson v. 
Laird, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1286, 1301 (1970) (stating that “[i]f the simple language of the clause” does 
not prohibit theological tests, “then it does not mean anything”). 
 153. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
 154. Cf. Sidak, supra note 6, at 9 (arguing that there is a “detectable odor of bigotry” against 
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In addition to historical evidence, status-based classifications such as 
religious affiliation and theological beliefs are logical analogues to the 
other status-based qualifications prescribed by the Constitution. The 
religious denomination with which one chooses to affiliate and the 
theology one espouses are quintessential attributes of religious believers as 
a class. These status-based classifications seem the most likely candidates 
for coverage by the Religious Test Clause’s reference to “Qualifications” 
for office. In contrast, ideological views, whether deduced from secularly-
or religiously-informed premises, do not separate religious believers from 
non-religious believers on religious status alone. 
Regardless of its unconstitutionality, inquiring into a judicial 
candidate’s religious affiliation or theology does not serve the policies 
underlying traditional ideological scrutiny. As discussed above, the 
political branches examine candidates’ ideological views to predict their 
future decisions. However, neither religious affiliation nor theology is a 
reliable indicium of a judge’s future decisionmaking.155 In the religious 
affiliation context, empirical studies indicate that judges of different 
religious affiliations may behave differently on the bench.156 This 
tendency is outweighed by the generality of the inference from religious 
conservative Catholics in contemporary American politics). 
 155. For efficiency, I accept that religious beliefs will play some role in judicial decisionmaking 
without concluding whether this role is proper in a liberal democracy. See generally Scott Idleman, 
The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993). For examples of 
the debate over whether religious beliefs should play a role in political decisions generally, see 
ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Five 
Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should be Excluded from Democratic 
Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639; Glenn Poshard, Leaders Must Separate Public Role from 
Private Belief System, S. ILLINOISAN, Aug. 5, 2004.  
 156. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The 
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 277, 281 (1995) 
(finding religious affiliation of federal district judges to affect outcomes of reference to magistrates 
and in civil rights cases); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 
69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 498 (1975) (finding that Catholic judges favor the “economic underdog” 
in cases of “injured persons and economic liberalism”); Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 20, at 502–
03 (finding significant differences between Jewish, Catholic, Baptist, and non-Baptist Protestant 
judges’ decisions in First Amendment Religion Clause cases); Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, 
The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme 
Courts, 61 J. POL. 507, 520–21 (1999) (finding that evangelical Protestant judges are more likely to 
uphold the death penalty, rule conservatively in obscenity cases, and rule for the employer in gender 
discrimination cases than are Jewish, mainline Protestant, or Catholic judges); S. Sidney Ulmer, Social 
Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947–1956 
Terms, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 622, 625–26 (1973) (finding difference between Protestant and non-
Protestant justices’ support for the government in criminal cases). For a popular level discussion of 
this issue, see Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 30, 2000, at 40 (“It’s 
striking how closely the positions of some of the justices in the church-state cases correspond to their 
own religious . . . backgrounds.”). 
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affiliation to ideology and the potentially grave risk of political branches 
acting based on religious bigotry. 
First, religious affiliation alone is too simplistic a criterion to reliably 
predict a judge’s future decisionmaking at the judicial selection stage. 
Indeed, denominational membership is not the primary indicium of 
religious belief in America partly because choosing to identify oneself 
with a denomination is not always indicative of belief in that 
denomination’s substantive doctrine.157 Religious denominations are 
essentially voluntary associations of individuals, each individual having a 
different rationale for publicly identifying themself as a member of the 
group.158 Even those who largely adhere to denominational doctrine may 
not be aware of,159 or may disagree with,160 official church doctrine. Yet 
others may accept church doctrine but support legal frameworks 
inconsistent with that belief.161 Because of these problems, presidents and 
 157. See Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and 
Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37, 57 (2000) (“Denominational categories are no longer sufficient or primary 
religious identifiers for many contemporary Americans.”). 
 158. Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 960 (2004). While some identify as members of religious 
denominations because they agree with denominational doctrine, some join for more amorphous 
sociological factors. For example, observant practitioners often refer to less observant members as 
“secular Jews,” “non-practicing Catholics,” or “Christmas and Easter Christians”—labels that would 
not exist but for certain groups of people who choose to identify themselves with a religious 
denomination but do not fulfill doctrinal attendance and lifestyle requirements. See, e.g., Halberstam, 
supra note 48, at 1441 (noting that Ginsburg is Jewish but “not a religiously observant Jew”); 
Levinson, Confrontation, supra note 6, at 1059 (discussing “secular Jew” and “cultural Catholic”); cf. 
Justice Ginsburg Reflects on Own Heritage (Apr. 23, 2004), APWIRES 00:35:50 (reporting that 
Ginsburg said that “her Jewish heritage and her work as a judge ‘fit together symmetrically’”). In 
Menora v. Ill. High School Ass’n, 527 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1981), an Orthodox Jewish plaintiff 
challenged the state high school sports association’s rule against wearing headgear during basketball 
games. Id. at 632–33. The Jewish judge responded to the defendant’s recusal motion by emphatically 
stating: “I am Jewish, but I am not an Orthodox Jew. I do not share the beliefs of plaintiffs, nor do I 
practice them.” Id. at 633. Obviously, Judge Shadur did not mind associating himself with Judaism, 
but made clear his objections to associating his Jewish identity with adherence to certain 
denominational doctrine.  
 159. Failinger, supra note 25, at 702–03 n.314 (“[A] Justice—of any faith-persuasion—may not 
understand his own theological tradition.”); see also Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and 
the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1661 (2004) 
(“[I]n any religious tradition or community, there will be disagreements, dissent, and ignorance.”).  
 160. See, e.g., Perry, Abortion, supra note 45, at 22 (noting that a majority of both Protestants and 
Catholics believe that abortion should be legal despite denominational doctrines to the contrary). 
 161. See, e.g., Mario Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s 
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 13, 17–20 (1984) (arguing that Catholic 
officeholders should not promote policies in line with religious teachings not beneficial to the public at 
large); Perry, Same-Sex Unions, supra note 45, at 479 (arguing that even Christians who believe that 
homosexual relationships are immoral should support same-sex unions); David Brooks, The Power of 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A15 (arguing that religious conservatives, who normally 
oppose same-sex marriage, should support same-sex marriage).  
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senators who attempt to infer ideological positions from a candidate’s 
religious affiliation162 risk relying more heavily on denominational 
doctrine than does the candidate herself in determining the candidate’s 
ideological positions. Thus, the political branches should not consider 
religious affiliation a reliable predictor of future decisionmaking. 
Second, if the Religious Test Clause permitted the political branches to 
consider religious affiliation, it would risk allowing the political branches 
to act out of religious bigotry, thereby contravening the clear intention to 
place all sects on the same level.  
Theological tests suffer a similar problem: People with similar 
theological beliefs often deduce markedly different political ideologies.163 
Knowing that a candidate believes that rights come from God, is a “God-
fearing person,” or rejects evolution as a biological theory provides little 
guidance in discerning how that candidate would actually decide specific 
legal issues. While such terms could serve as a form of code triggering 
other meanings, the mere recitation of such a belief does not in itself 
communicate any substance from which one could infer the candidate’s 
future judicial decisions. Presidents and senators attempting to infer the 
candidate’s ideology from theological beliefs risk lending theology more 
credit in determining ideology than does the candidate herself. Possibly for 
these reasons, American legal and political leaders have long considered 
both religious affiliation164 and theology165 irrelevant in distinguishing 
between public officials. Thus the political branches would be remiss to 
rely on theological beliefs in attempting to infer a candidate’s ideology.  
 162. For an example of such inferences, see PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT 143 (1992) 
(explaining that Senator Paul Simon attempted to deduce Justice Thomas’s position on abortion from 
his religious affiliation and the doctrines of the specific church Thomas attended). 
 163. See Failinger, supra note 25, at 702 n.314. 
 164. Justice Felix Frankfurter thought that denominational differences between judges should not 
be considered relevant to the judge’s performance, for “judges . . . are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither 
Catholic nor agnostic. [Judges] owe . . . attachment to the Constitution and are . . . bound by [their] 
judicial obligations.” West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646–67 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Political leaders have expressed similar sentiments: Senator Patrick Leahy 
argued that the Clause precludes considering “[w]hether a nominee goes to church, temple, or mosque, 
or [nothing at all].” 148 CONG. REC., S2000 (statement by Sen. Leahy) (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2002). 
 165. Thomas Jefferson was perhaps the most vocal opponent of theological tests. He famously 
renounced theological tests in the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in which he wrote that 
capacity to serve in public office should not depend on one’s willingness to “profess or renounce this 
or that religious opinion.” A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in 
MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 70. Jefferson thought that one’s subscription to particular 
theological beliefs was irrelevant to one’s qualification for public office. Waldron Hayes, Jr., Recent 
Decision, Public Office, Religion, and the Constitution, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 372, 376 (1961) (quoting 
Thomas Jefferson as saying that “it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or 
no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”). 
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Even absent the historical, structural, and theoretical reasons, history 
suggests that political branch consideration of religious affiliation and 
theology risks trivializing religious devotion. Both political branches have 
learned to manipulate electoral support by appointing judges of certain 
religious affiliations.166 The political branches have thereby used 
denominational affiliation for political expediency and calculation rather 
than respecting religion as formalized personal relationships with a 
transcendent Reality or as a “manifestation of divinity through 
reconstituted relationships with others.”167 These political calculations 
threaten the Framers’ conception of, and the modern respect for, religious 
affiliation and theology as personal and non-political.168
B. Religiously Motivated Ideology 
The Religious Test Clause should not prohibit political branch scrutiny 
of a judicial candidate’s ideological views motivated by religion. Neither 
the Religious Test Clause’s history nor its subsequent interpretation 
indicates that it prohibits discrimination against individuals because of 
their religiously motivated ideological beliefs. In addition, the policies 
underlying traditional ideological scrutiny indicate that ideological beliefs 
should be subjects of inquiry as reliable indicia of judicial decisionmaking. 
The European and state religious tests disavowed in the Religious Test 
Clause did not require profession of ideological beliefs, whereas they did 
require profession of denominational membership or belief in state-
endorsed theology. The Supreme Court distinguished between religious 
and political tests: the Religious Test Clause prohibits requiring a 
profession of belief in God’s existence169 but permits testing for 
communist ideals.170 Article VI itself distinguishes between ideological 
 166. See, e.g., KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 20, at 144 (discussing presidential courting of 
Jewish vote by appointing Jewish judges); Perry, supra note 23, at 74–81 (discussing President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s use of Justice Frank Murphy’s nomination to solidify support among Catholic 
voters); Jacoby, supra note 31 (discussing President George W. Bush’s using judicial nominations to 
reward conservative evangelicals).  
 167. Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 
15 n.33 and accompanying text); cf. Garnett, supra note 159, at 1665 (remarking that American culture 
often views religious devotion as expressions of “subjective longings, of autonomous self-expression 
and direction, and of consumer preferences, rather than as a response to a set of proposed truth-claims 
about the meaning of life and the destiny of the person”). 
 168. See Hayes, supra note 165, at 373 (describing conception of religious belief as non-political).  
 169. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). For more discussion of Torcaso, see 
supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414–15 (1950). For discussion of 
Douds, see supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
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and “religious” matters. It requires public officials to swear commitment 
to ideological beliefs such as support for the Constitution, while it 
prevents government from establishing religious qualifications.171 In 
interpreting Article VI, one state court noted that “[t]he draftsmen of the 
Constitution did not consider an oath to support the Constitution a 
religious test, else they violated the restriction in the writing of the 
requirement. . . . [There is no] inconsistency between the two 
clauses. . . .”172
Likewise, the structure of the Constitution indicates that “religious” 
tests are a narrower category of criteria than constitutionally permissible 
substantive selection criteria such as ideology. Ideological views that 
affect a candidate’s judicial decisionmaking are amorphous criteria in 
contrast to the rigid status-based qualifications the Constitution prescribes 
in other contexts. Religiously motivated ideological views such as a 
judicial candidate’s opposition to abortion or capital punishment do not 
depend on that candidate’s status as a religious believer per se: Individuals 
deducing such views from religious premises could share the same 
ideological convictions as individuals deducing views from secular 
premises.  
Testing candidates’ religiously motivated ideological views aligns with 
historical concern for the political branches’ ability to decide whether to 
nominate and confirm based on reliable predictions of future judicial 
decisionmaking.173 A judge’s ideology, whether deduced from religious or 
secular premises, affects how that judge fulfills her role on the bench.174 
 171. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll . . . judicial officers, both of the United States and of the 
several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”); 
see also Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 161–62 (1971) 
(discussing ideological character of oath to uphold the Constitution similar to that of Article VI). This 
ideological oath could be seen as a religious test itself: “The constitutional oath may not be a ‘religious 
Test’ for those who define religion as necessarily including affirmations of supernatural beings and 
theological propositions, but it is surely a test establishing one’s devotion to the civil religion as a 
predicate condition for the ability to hold office.” LEVINSON, supra note 92, at 55.  
 172. Smith v. County Eng’r of San Diego County, 72 Cal. Rptr. 501, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 173. In an analogous situation involving jury selection, a military court found that religious beliefs 
that “cast light on [the prospective juror’s] personal fairness and impartiality” can be the subject of 
inquiry without violating the Religious Test Clause. United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 646 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 4 M.J. 118 (C.M.A. 1977). 
 174. See supra note 64. For example, if a judicial candidate disapproves of homosexual 
individuals, then that ideological value—whether purportedly motivated by religious or secular 
premises—likely indicates how that judicial candidate will decide cases regarding rights of 
homosexual individuals. In Ex parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21 (Ala. 2002), former Chief Justice Roy Moore 
wrote a concurring opinion arguing that homosexual parents should not be allowed to have custody of 
their own children because “[h]omosexual conduct is . . . a violation of the laws of nature and of 
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Unlike religious affiliation and theology, presidents and senators can 
directly deduce a candidate’s likely resolution of specific legal issues by 
understanding that candidate’s religiously motivated ideology.  
If the Religious Test Clause proscribed inquiring into a candidate’s 
religiously motivated ideology, it would force the political branches to 
distinguish between a candidate’s political stances motivated by religion 
and those motivated by non-religious values. Religiously sincere 
candidates will likely be unable to distinguish their views because 
“religious beliefs and experiences are likely to be thoroughly intertwined 
with legal, political, and social influences.”175 If the candidates are unable 
accurately to separate their own ideological views, presidents and senators 
are even less able to so distinguish. Similar difficulties arise in defining 
what beliefs are truly “religious” so as to deem the ideology flowing from 
them religiously motivated.176
Permitting political branches to scrutinize a candidate’s religiously 
motivated ideology puts religiously motivated candidates on the same 
plane as non-religious candidates. Not scrutinizing religiously motivated 
ideology implicitly deems religious moral reasoning subordinate to non-
religious morality whereas both are merely two sides of the same coin.177 
nature’s God.” Id. at 26. Whether Moore’s belief that homosexuality violated the “laws of nature” (a 
secular premise) or his belief that homosexuality violated the laws of “nature’s God” (a religious 
premise) motivated his decision makes no difference to the actual outcome of the case: There is no 
substantive difference between a purported religious motivation such as Moore’s and a judicial 
candidate that claims that homosexuality violates only the “laws of nature” without mentioning 
“nature’s God.” 
 175. Berg & Ross, supra note 48, at 394; see also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS 
AND POLITICAL CHOICE 5 (1988) (“My convictions tell me that no aspect of life should be wholly 
untouched by the transcendent reality in which I believe . . . .”); Carter, supra note 6, at 943 (arguing 
that the goal should be to “treat all moral knowledge as one and once we decide to allow judges to rely 
on it, not to be fussy about its source”). 
 176. Courts and theologians have struggled to articulate a definition of “religion” properly 
inclusive of both theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163, 165–66 (1965) (defining “religious training and belief” as including systems of belief that are 
“sincere and meaningful [and which occupy] a place in its life of its possessor parallel to that filled by” 
the traditional theistic belief in God); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., 
concurring) (finding that the constitutional definition of “religion” should be interpreted broadly to 
extend beyond traditional theistic religious beliefs); WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE 36 (Modern Library 1994) (1902) (“Religion . . . mean[s] . . . the feelings, acts, and 
experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation 
to whatever they may consider the divine. . . . [T]he relation may be either moral, physical, or 
ritual. . . .”); PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948) (describing religion as a 
translation of traditional God imagery into “the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or your 
ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation”); Mark A. Boatman, Note, Lee 
v. Weisman: In Search of a Defensible Test for Establishment of Religion, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 
829–30 (1993) (describing difficulties in defining “religion” in Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
 177. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Checking the Artifacts of Canaan: A Comment on Levinson’s 
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It would also permit candidates and their supporters to play the “religion 
card,” draping their politics in religious clothing and thereby subverting 
the traditional scrutiny applied to judicial candidates.178 If the Clause 
proscribed inquiry into religiously motivated ideology, those with extreme 
ideological beliefs on either side of the political debates could claim a 
religious exemption merely because they could articulate some 
connection—however tenuous—between their ideology and religion.179 By 
permitting inquiry into a candidate’s religiously motivated ideology, the 
Clause ensures the sect equality sought by its Framers.  
CONCLUSION 
In times of contentious debate over the proper relationship between 
religion and government, the political branches’ respect for constitutional 
religious freedom protections should be at its zenith. However, presidents 
and senators have long forgotten the basic protection from religious 
bigotry in public employment manifested in the Religious Test Clause. 
The growing debate over the Clause’s proper scope will eventually 
demand that the political branches grapple with the constitutional 
limitations on their ability to prescribe ideological tests as qualifications 
for judicial office. Only by prohibiting inquiry into judicial candidates’ 
religious affiliations and theological beliefs and permitting inquiry into 
religiously motivated ideological beliefs can the political branches avoid 
“Confrontation”, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1142 (1990) (“If the guardians of American liberal 
democracy were serious in their talk of pluralism . . . [n]o moral belief would be silenced because it 
was also religious.”). 
 178. For example, Republicans allegedly “use[d] religion as a defense” in Judge William Pryor’s 
nomination hearings to divert attention from his political beliefs. 149 CONG. REC. S10,462 (daily ed. 
July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin). In Senator Durbin’s view, this permitted him to cast the 
issue of his political beliefs as an issue of religious faith. Id.  
 179. Some argued that Judge Charles Pickering claimed such a religious exemption from 
discussing his support for issues considered by critics to be outside the mainstream. Neil A. Lewis, 
President Renominating Federal Judge Lott Backed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A17 (describing 
Pickering’s alleged support for strengthening anti-miscegenation laws, his reduction of sentences for 
defendants convicted of cross-burning, and his work on behalf of segregationist groups); see also 
Cornyn, supra note 129, at 24–26 (arguing that Pickering’s views were religiously motivated and 
therefore senators should not have considered them). For examples of extremism masquerading as 
religion in other contexts, see Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 505 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(describing Ku Klux Klan seeking a religious exemption from Title VII); Nicholas D. Kristof, Jesus 
and Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2004, at A13 (describing best-selling fundamentalist Christian book 
glorifying the annihilation of all non-Christians). For an example of arguable extremism from the other 
side of the political spectrum, see Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414–15 (1950) 
(exploring party’s argument that communism was a “religious” belief protected by the Religious Test 
Clause).  
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the Religious Test Clause prohibition while fulfilling their traditional role 
of subjecting judicial candidates to ideological scrutiny. 
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